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Abstract: The interplay between growth and public debt is addressed considering a
Barro-type [1] endogenous growth model where public spending is financed through taxes
on income and public debt. Debt is assumed to be a fixed proportion of GDP which is
used as a policy parameter by the government. We first show that when debt is a large
enough proportion of GDP, two distinct BGPs may co-exist, one being indeterminate.
Therefore, local and global indeterminacy may arise and self-fulfilling expectations appear
as a crucial ingredient to understand the impact of debt on growth and on macroeconomic
fluctuations. We then exhibit two types of important trade-off associated with self-fulfilling
expectations. First, we show that the lowest BGP is always decreasing with respect to the
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1 Introduction
The last financial crisis has shed the light on the problem of large public debt
in developed countries, in particular in Europe. Actually, in many advanced
countries, debt levels have increased dramatically during the two last decades.
The control of the growth rate of public spendings has become a major concern
for economists and policy-makers while public deficits are reaching extremely
high amounts. Indeed, a heavily indebted country may appear as fragile, for
many reasons, among which solvency, or simply because it is unlikely to raise
sufficient funds to deal with a large negative shock on its economy.
The Maastricht treaty introduced a rule on the maximal amount a country
may contract, limiting the debt to 60% of GDP, but over the last decade this
limit has been exceeded by almost all European countries. Most advanced
countries, not only European ones, are now characterized by large amounts of
public debt, low growth rates and large fluctuations of GDP. Given this fact,
two types of questions become central:
1. What is the relationship between the level of debt and growth?
2. What is the relationship between macroeconomic stability and debt
level?
Whereas the literature has focused recently on the first question, mainly
through empirical analyses, little attention has been paid to the second.
This paper proposes to fill this gap and to study the relationships between
debt, level of growth and macroeconomic fluctuations in the simple frame-
work of a Barro-type [1] endogenous growth model. Our aim is precisely to
discuss the effect of public debt on the endogenous growth rate and on the
fluctuations of this growth rate. We focus on government intervention as a
source of macroeconomic fluctuations when government spending is financed
through taxes on income and public debt. Public spending is useful because it
improves households’ utility of consumption and production as externalities.
In order to focus on the recent public policies, we assume that debt is a fixed
proportion of GDP and that this proportion is used as a policy parameter by
the government.
The size of public debt as a proportion of GDP and its impact on growth
has been widely discussed and debated from an empirical point of view over
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the recent years. The well-known paper of Reinhart and Rogoff [22] shows
that a gross public debt exceeding 90% of nominal GDP on a sustained basis
may have a significant negative impact on the growth rate.1 While subject
to a recent controversy,2 this type of result has led the IMF after the starting
of the global financial crisis to strongly advise European countries to decrease
their debt. The main objective was to boost growth but also to stabilize the
economies. However, the recent empirical literature shows that the conclusions
are not so clear-cut. While some recent contributions find evidences for a
negative relationship between average debt-to-GDP ratios and long-run growth
performance (Woo and Kumar [27]), others find several thresholds for the debt-
to-GDP ratio and the size of the impact on growth may be small (Baum et al.
[2]). More generally, the relationship between debt and growth appears to be
based on complex non-linear effects and to be heterogeneous across countries.3
In particular, Minea and Parent [13] show that for debt-to-GDP ratios above
115%, the correlation between growth and debt becomes positive.
The impact of debt on the stability of economies has also been discussed.
For instance, Sutherland et al. [25] argue that the level of government debt
has a significative impact on business cycle characteristics. They identify the
characteristics of a “low debt” business cycle and a “high debt” business cycle
aggregating the countries according to their level of debt. In countries with
high debt, the cycle is more pronounced, with phases of expansions longer and
larger and recessions also more pronounced. Such differences usually rely on
the “vulnerability” of high public debt economies. Government then have less
latitude to run the appropriate fiscal policy in case of negative shocks. As
explained in Panizza and Presbitero [20], beside all these empirical studies, a
precise theoretical analysis of the existence of non-monotonicity or threshold
effects in the relationship between public debt, economic growth and aggregate
fluctuations is not yet available in the literature. Our paper provides a first step
1See also Reinhart et al. [21] and [23].
2Herndon et al. [12] have indeed identified a mistake in the methodology of Reinhart and
Rogoff [22]. They show that when properly calculated, the average real GDP growth rate
for countries carrying a public-debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90% is significantly larger than
the level evaluated by Reinhart and Rogoff.
3See for instance Eberhart and Presbitero [7] and the survey of Panizza and Presbitero
[20].
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in that direction focusing on the role of global indeterminacy and self-fulfilling
expectations.
While not directly concerned with the impact of debt on growth and
macroeconomic instability, Collard et al. [4]-[5] provide an interesting fo-
cus with respect to our research agenda. They analyse the determinants of
government debt under the twin assumptions that governments have limited
horizons and default only when government income falls short of debt service
requirements. They derive a government’s maximum sustainable debt ratio,
that strongly varies across countries. The difference between actual and max-
imum sustainable debt ratios then creates a “margin of safety” that allows
governments to increase debt if necessary with little corresponding increase in
default risk. In light of these results, when we focus on the recent experiences
of Spain and Italy who have faced increasing interest rates generated by spec-
ulative attacks against their sovereign debt, we clearly see that an objective
“margin of safety”, based on countries’ fundamentals, may not be enough to
prevent a large increase of the perceived default risk by investors. This remark
suggests a potential for expectation-driven effects. This is precisely the main
focus of our paper.
Our framework allows to contribute to these different debates, i.e. the in-
terplay between the ratio of debt over GDP and both growth and expectation-
driven macroeconomic fluctuations. On the one hand, uniqueness of the bal-
anced growth path (BGP) is obtained in two different circumstances: (i) when
the tax rate is weak and debt is a small proportion of GDP, or (ii) when the
tax rate is strong and debt is a large proportion of GDP. In case (i), the long-
run growth rate is decreasing in the share of debt as a proportion of GDP,4
while it is increasing in case (ii). There is also a difference in terms of the local
stability properties of the BGP. In case (i), the BGP can be locally determi-
nate or indeterminate depending on the level of debt. There exists indeed a
critical level below which local determinacy arises and expectations do not af-
fect the dynamics. On the contrary, if the ratio of debt-to-GDP is larger than
this level, the BGP becomes locally indeterminate leading to the existence of
expectation-driven fluctuations. Under a sufficiently large level of debt, expec-
4When uniqueness of BGP holds, this is a standard result. See for instance Saint-Paul
[24].
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tations on future growth rates are self-fulfilling. In case (ii), this mechanism
is amplified and local indeterminacy of BGP always holds.
On the other hand, when the fiscal pressure is strong enough and the share
of debt as proportion of GDP admits intermediary but sufficiently large val-
ues, two distinct BGPs may co-exist. Global indeterminacy may arise and
self-fulfilling expectations appear as a crucial ingredient to understand the
impact of debt on growth. We also exhibit two types of important trade-off
associated with self-fulfilling expectations. First, we show that the lowest BGP
is always decreasing in the ratio of debt over GDP, while the highest one is
increasing. As suggested by the recent literature on non-linear relationships
between debt and growth, depending on the BGP selected by agents’ expec-
tations, the relationship between debt and growth is not necessarily negative.
This result contributes to the debate suggested by Panizza and Presbitero [20]
and may in particular match the conclusion of Minea and Parent [13].
Second, we clearly exhibit a trade-off between welfare and macroeconomic
fluctuations: with a large enough debt-to-GDP ratio, the highest BGP, which
provides the highest welfare, is always locally indeterminate while the lowest
is always locally determinate. Our results then show non-trivial effects of debt
on growth and macroeconomic fluctuations. Depending on the expectations of
agents, when debt is increasing large, fluctuations associated to self-fulfilling
believes may occur and be associated at the same time with welfare losses
if there is a coordination on the low steady-state. These results clearly show
that, above a threshold, the size of debt has a dramatic impact on the dynamic
properties of equilibria.
We also discuss the implications of our conclusions for the main OECD
countries considering numerical illustrations based on realistic calibrations for
the size of debt, the growth rate and the main fundamentals. We show that
the OECD countries can be splited into two subsets: a first one with coun-
tries characterized by global indeterminacy and two long run growth rates, the
lowest being associated to a strong recession, and a second one with countries
characterized by a unique long run growth rate which is locally indetermi-
nate. In particular, except Greece and Portugal who are in the second set, all
European countries belong to the first set and may be all subject to strong
macroeconomic fluctuations based on pessimistic expectations. Our analysis
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then provides a basis for understanding the recent experiences of many OECD
countries relating macroeconomic instability to self-fulfilling expectations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we present
the model and define the intertemporal equilibrium. In Section 3, we discuss
the effect of debt in the long run analyzing the existence and multiplicity of
steady-states, comparative statics and welfare. Section 4 provides an analysis
of the effect of debt in the short run focusing on sunspot fluctuations and
global indeterminacy. Section 5 presents numerical illustrations based on the
main OECD countries. Section 6 concludes the paper and a final Appendix
contains all the proofs.
1.1 Related literature
As explained previously, there are few theoretical contributions that study the
link between debt, growth and fluctuations in endogenous growth models. On
the one hand, Futagami et al. [8] consider a government which focuses on a
target for its policy based on the level of debt to the size of the economy, namely
the capital stock. They show that multiple BGPs may arise together with
local indeterminacy and expectation-driven fluctuations.5 However, Minea and
Villieu [15] prove that these conclusions are not robust to the consideration of
a debt-to-GDP target for the government. They show indeed that in this case,
there exists a unique BGP which is locally determinate. In light of our results,
there conclusion seems to be quite sensitive to the specification of consumers’
preferences. On the other hand, Greiner and Semmler [9, 10] examine how
government’s financing method affects economies. They show that the link
between public deficit and long run growth is not clear cut. However, they do
not particularly focus on the impact of the ratio of debt-to-GDP.
Our paper can also be seen as an extension of models with public spending
but without public debt, like Cazzavillan [3]. He shows that a strong pub-
lic good externality in preferences, such that utility has increasing returns,
is required to have indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations. We assume
5Minea and Villieu [14] prove the possible existence of multiple BGPs and a form of
global (but not local) indeterminacy considering instead a deficit-to-GDP target for the
government.
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instead that the utility function is characterized by a small public good ex-
ternality and, thus, decreasing returns. This confirms that the main channel
through which self-fulfilling expectations arise in our framework is the level of
debt over GDP.
Finally, note that, in two recent papers, we have already studied the con-
sequences of the constant level of debt over GDP on macroeconomic stability,
but without endogenous growth. In Nishimura et al. [18], we consider a
stationary Ramsey economy with heterogeneous agents and without a public
good externality in production. We assume that the tax rate is constant while
public spending is endogenously adjusted. We show that public debt can be
destabilizing or stabilizing, i.e. generating or ruling out damped or persis-
tent macroeconomic fluctuations (period-two cycles), depending on whether
the public spending externality and the elasticity of capital labor substitution
are low or large. However, indeterminacy can never occur. In Nishimura et
al. [19], we also consider a stationary Ramsey economy but with homogeneous
agents and without any externality in the fundamentals. We assume instead
a constant public spending and thus, through the budget constraint of the
government, an endogenous adjustment of the tax rate. We then show that a
large enough debt can be destabilizing through the occurrence of self-fulfilling
expectations and sunspot-driven fluctuations.
2 The model
We consider a discrete time economy (t = 0, 1, ...,∞), with three types of
agents, a constant population of identical infinitely lived households, a large
number of identical competitive firms and a government.
2.1 Households
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor and an initial stock of private
physical capital which depreciates at a constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1). We assume
that the total population is normalized to one. The representative agent has
separable preferences over time which depend on consumption ct and public
spending Gt that is assumed to act as an externality on utility for consumption.
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To be consistent with endogenous growth, we assume that the intertemporal
utility function is given by
+∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−θt
1− θ
Gηt (1)
with β ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor, θ ∈ (0, 1) the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption (EIS), and η ≥ 0 the size of the
public good externality such that 1 > θ − η ≥ 0. These restrictions allow
to consider low enough public spending externalities in utility and some EIS
larger than one. Indeed, the most recent estimates by Gruber [11] (see also
Mulligan [16], Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio [26]) exhibit values around 2.
This also means that the degree of homogeneity of the instantaneous utility
function 1 − θ + η is lower than one, i.e. we do not allow increasing returns
due to public spending externalities.
The representative household derives income from wage, capital and gov-
ernment bonds that allow to finance public debt. Denote rt the real interest
rate on physical capital, r¯t the interest rate on government bonds and wt the
real wage. The representative household pays taxes on labor income, cap-
ital income and on the remuneration of bonds’ holding, at a constant rate
τ ∈ (0, 1). He then maximizes (1) facing the budget constraint:
ct + kt+1 + bt+1 = (1− τ)[rtkt + wt] + [1 + (1− τ)r¯t] bt + (1− δ)kt (2)
Utility maximization gives:(
ct+1
ct
)θ (
Gt+1
Gt
)−η
= βRt+1 = β [1 + (1− τ)r¯t+1] (3)
with the gross interest rate Rt+1 ≡ (1 − τ)rt+1 + 1 − δ and the transversality
conditions
lim
t→+∞
βtc−θt G
η
t kt+1 = 0 and lim
t→+∞
βtc−θt G
η
t bt+1 = 0
(4)
Obviously, we get at the equilibrium the equality Rt+1 = [1 + (1− τ)r¯t+1] since
physical capital kt+1 and government bonds bt+1 are perfectly substitutable
saving assets.
2.2 Firms
A representative firm produces the final good yt using a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology with constant returns at the private level but which is also affected by
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a public good externality, yt = Ak
s
t (LtGt)
1−s, where s ∈ (0, 1/2) is the share of
capital income in GDP and A > 0 is a productivity parameter. As population
is normalized to one, Lt = 1, we get a standard Barro-type [1] formulation
such that yt = Ak
s
tG
1−s
t . Profit maximization then gives:
rt = As
(
Gt
kt
)1−s
and wt = A(1− s)kt
(
Gt
kt
)1−s
(5)
2.3 Government
Public spending Gt is financed by total income taxation and debt, through the
following budget constraint:
Gt + (1 + r¯t)bt = τ(rtkt + wt + r¯tbt) + bt+1 (6)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant proportional tax rate on households’ total
income. Total public expenditure is the sum of public spendings Gt and the
reimbursement of debt contracted the previous period (1 + r¯t)bt, and bt+1 is
the new issue of debt.
In accordance with sustainability constraints like the one imposed by the
Maastricht treaty, we assume that debt cannot exceed a fixed proportion of
GDP, namely bt ≤ αyt. In this paper, we consider equilibria with positive
debt. Along a balanced growth path with positive debt, both bt and yt grow
at the same rate. Accordingly, we will focus in the following on equilibria with
bt = αyt along which α can be interpreted as a policy parameter under the
control of the government (see de la Croix and Michel [6]). The limit case
without debt is of course obtained when α = 0.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
Let us consider equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) with bt = αyt. Using (5) and
(6), equation (2) becomes:
ct + kt+1 +Gt = yt + (1− δ)kt (7)
Let us also denote xt ≡ Gt/kt, dt ≡ ct/kt, and γt ≡ kt+1/kt the growth factor.
We derive yt = Aktx
1−s
t . Therefore, equations (3), (6) and (7) can be written
as follows: (
dt+1
dt
)θ (
xt+1
xt
)−η
γθ−ηt = β
[
(1− τ)Asx1−st+1 + 1− δ
]
(8)
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xt + αAx
1−s
t
[
(1− τ)Asx1−st + 1− δ
]
= τAx1−st + αAx
1−s
t+1γt (9)
dt + γt + xt = Ax
1−s
t + 1− δ (10)
From (10) we derive some expressions for dt and dt+1. Substituting these
expressions into (8) allows finally to define an intertemporal equilibrium as a
pair {xt, γt}t≥0 solution of the following system of two difference equations:
βxηt+1
(1−τ)Asx1−st+1+1−δ
[Ax1−st+1−xt+1+1−δ−γt+1]
θ =
γθ−ηt x
η
t
[Ax1−st −xt+1−δ−γt]
θ
αAx1−st+1γt = xt − τAx
1−s
t + αAx
1−s
t
[
(1− τ)Asx1−st + 1− δ
] (11)
and the transversality conditions (4) with k0 given.
6 Note that there is no
predetermined variable in this dynamical system. Indeed, γ0 depends on k1,
and from (9), x0 depends on x1. This means that xt and γt are both forward
variables. Note also that the initial consumption c0 has to be chosen in ac-
cordance with any initial choice of γ0 and x0 since, using (10), c0 is given by
c0 = k0
[
Ax1−s0 − x0 + (1− δ)− γ0
]
.
Note finally that when there is no debt, i.e. α = 0, the second equation of
the system (11) leads to a constant value for x and the dynamical system be-
comes one-dimensional with a difference equation characterizing the dynamics
of the growth factor γt.
3 Effect of debt in the long run: Steady-states,
comparative statics and welfare
A (non trivial) steady-state equilibrium corresponds to a stationary sequence
{xt, γt} = {x
∗, γ∗} ∈ R2++ for all t which satisfies the system (11). The sta-
tionary value of the growth factor γ∗ allows to define a balanced-growth path
(BGP) along which all the variables ct, kt and Gt grow at the common constant
rate g∗ = γ∗ − 1.
Along a steady-state equilibrium, the first equation of system (11) gives:
x(γ) =
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βAs(1−τ)
) 1
1−s (12)
6Of course, there is usually an initial condition on public debt. One way to conciliate it
with the fiscal rule bt = αyt and the government budget (6) from t = 0 is to consider an
initial condition b−1 > 0 satisfying G−1 + b−1(1 + r−1) = τ(y−1 + r−1b−1) + αy0.
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Because we introduce endogenous growth explained by productive public
spendings (Barro [1]), this equation establishes a positive link between G/k
and the growth factor γ. Indeed, a larger level of public spendings per unit of
capital means a larger interest rate, that fosters growth. Substituting this ex-
pression into the second equation implies that γ∗ is a solution of the following
equation:
∆(γ) = Ω(γ) (13)
with
∆(γ) ≡ 1
A
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βAs(1−τ)
) s
1−s
+ α γ
θ−η
β
, and Ω(γ) ≡ τ + αγ (14)
Obviously, the expression of x(γ) implies that any admissible solution must
satisfy γ > [β(1 − δ)]
1
θ−η ≡ γinf . This means that any BGP is characterized
by strictly positive ratios of public spendings over capital and interest rate
r = sAx1−s. Moreover, as along a BGP all the variables ct, kt and Gt grow at
the common constant rate, the transversality conditions (4) evaluated along
such a BGP hold if γ < β
1
θ−η−1 ≡ γsup, with γsup > γinf . Note that the
condition γ < γsup is also equivalent to γ
θ−η/β = R > γ which means that the
interest factor is larger than the growth factor.
In the following, we restrict our attention to tax rates that are not unreal-
istically large:
Assumption 1. τ < 1− s.
Since we assume that s < 1/2, this assumption is always fulfilled for tax
rates lower or equal than one half. According to our numerical illustration (see
Table 1 in Section 5), this corresponds to the empirical evidence found at least
in OECD countries.
Any equilibrium γ ∈ (γinf , γsup) has also to satisfy d(γ) = Ax
1−s − x+ 1−
δ − γ > 0. This inequality is ensured by the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, there exists Â > 0 such that if A > Â, we
have d(γ) > 0 for all γ ∈ (γinf , γsup).
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
Based on this Lemma, the existence and the number of stationary solutions
such that γ ∈ (γinf , γsup) are derived using only equation (13). As a benchmark
case, we start by considering the configuration without debt:
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Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, let A > Â and α = 0. Then there
exists τˆ ∈ (0, 1− s) such that there is a unique steady-state γ∗ ∈ (γinf , γsup) if
and only if τ ∈ (0, τˆ).
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
This case corresponds to the Barro [1] model. Let us rewrite the budget
constraint of the government (9) evaluated at the steady state as follows:
G
y
+ αR = τ + αγ ⇔ x
s
A
+ αR = τ + αγ (15)
with R = (1−τ)sAx1−s+1−δ. We also get the following equivalent expression
for the capital accumulation equation (10):
d+ γ − 1 + δ = Ax1−s
[
1− x
s
A
]
(16)
When α = 0, we then get x = (Aτ)1/s and d+γ− (1−δ) = A1/sτ (1−s)/s(1−τ).
As it is well-known, a larger tax rate has two effects. On the one hand, it
reduces the disposable income, meaning that there are less incentives to invest.
On the other hand, it raises the tax base. Under Assumption 1, the second
effect dominates. As a result, if τ is large, i.e. close to the labor share 1−s, the
tax revenue and thus the expression τ (1−s)/s(1− τ) are too large,7 and there is
no balanced budget satisfying positive consumption and/or the transversality
condition. On the contrary, when the tax rate is low enough, i.e. lower than τˆ ,
uniqueness of the steady state comes from the fact that in the Barro [1] model,
there is a positive link between G/k or G/y and γ because public spendings
are productive. If γ is low, the ratio G/y is quite close to 0, and there is an
excess of the tax revenue, while if γ is large enough, there is a surplus of public
spendings. The budget is then balanced between these two configurations and
the associated consumption is positive.
When α > 0, the uniqueness of the steady-state is not always ensured or
may occur under different fiscal pressures. The results are summarized in the
following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, let A > Â and α > 0. Then there exist
τˆ ∈ (0, 1− s), α̂ > α > 0 and Θ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following results hold:
7Note indeed that τ (1−s)/s(1− τ) is maximized when τ = 1− s.
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1. There is a unique steady-state γ∗ ∈ (γinf , γsup) if one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
(a) α < α̂ and τ ∈ (0, τˆ);
(b) α > α̂ and τ ∈ (τˆ , 1− s);
2. There are two steady-states γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ∈ (γinf , γsup), with γ
∗
1 < γ
∗
2, if α ∈
(α, α̂), τ ∈ (τˆ , 1− s) and θ − η ∈ (0, Θ˜).
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
The existence of a steady-state is obtained in two different configurations:
i) when the share of debt over GDP and the tax rate are both low enough,
or ii) when they are both large enough. There is therefore a form of positive
relationship between debt and tax for the existence of endogenous growth. If
the tax rate is large enough, there may also exist two admissible steady-states
as long as the share α of public debt over GDP takes intermediate values
and the utility function is close enough to a linear one (θ − η weak enough).
Contrary to the conclusions of Minea and Villieu [15], we show here that
considering the debt-to-GDP ratio as a policy instrument does not necessarily
preclude the existence of multiple BGPs. Note however that if we assume as
in Minea and Villieu [15] that θ = 1 and η = 0, then multiplicity is ruled out.
Recall that the transversality condition is equivalent to R = γθ−η/β > γ.
The interpretation of uniqueness of the steady state when both τ and α are
low enough (Case 1 (a) of Proposition 2) is quite similar to the case without
debt, after Proposition 1. The main difference with the case α = 0 is that now
taxation is also used to finance the difference between debt reimbursement Rtbt
and new debt emission bt+1 which becomes (R − γ)b at the steady-state, but
this is not a dominant effect since debt b = αy is low.
In Case 1 (b) of Proposition 2, we still have uniqueness of the steady state,
but the story is different. Let us rewite equation (15) as follows
α(R− γ) + x
s
A
= τ (17)
The difference between debt reimbursement and debt emission is measured by
R− γ > 0. When γ is close to its upper bound, this difference is close to zero.
Since the tax rate is close to 1− s, there is an excess of tax revenue and debt
emission with respect to public spendings and reimbursement of debt leading
to α(R− γ) + xs/A < τ . On the contrary, when γ is close to its lower bound,
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the debt reimbursement R − γ is quite large. Despite the fact that public
spendings are lower, there is a surplus of spending and debt reimbursement
implying α(R−γ)+xs/A > τ . Uniqueness of the steady-state is then ensured.
The coexistence of two steady states (Case 2 of Proposition 2) is explained
by the same story except that now the size of debt is lower as α ∈ (α, α̂).
When γ increases from γinf to γsup, public spendings raise while the difference
between debt reimbursement and debt emission reduces. In other words, these
two effects go in opposite directions following a raise of γ. Since the ratio of
debt-to-GDP has intermediate values and the tax rate is large enough, there is
an excess of funds to finance public spendings and debt reimbursement when
the growth factor is either close to γinf ( public spending over GDP low enough)
or close to γsup (difference between debt reimbursement and debt emission low
enough). In both cases, we then have α(R − γ) + xs/A > τ and multiple
steady-states may arise.
The following Figure summarizes the conclusions of Proposition 2:
γ∗1 , γ
∗
2
1− sτˆ τ
0
α
αˆ
γ∗!
γ∗!
α
Figure 1: Uniqueness and multiplicity of steady-states.
In the following Corollary, we examine how the different types of steady-
states vary according to variations of the debt-output ratio. However, dis-
cussing the impact of a policy parameter on the growth factor is not enough
in an optimal intertemporal dynamic model. We need also to focus on the
welfare that can be easily computed along the long-run balanced growth path
characterized by the stationary values of the growth factor γ, consumption d
and government spending x. We have indeed
W (γ) =
k
1−(θ−η)
0
1−θ
d(γ)1−θx(γ)η
1−βγ1−(θ−η)
(18)
We get the following result:
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, let A > Â and α > 0. The following
results hold:
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1. If α < α̂ and τ ∈ (0, τˆ), dγ∗/dα < 0;
2. If α > α̂ and τ ∈ (τˆ , 1− s), dγ∗/dα > 0;
3. If α ∈ (α, α̂), τ ∈ (τˆ , 1 − s) and θ − η ∈ (0, Θ˜), dγ∗1/dα < 0 and
dγ∗2/dα > 0.
Moreover, there exist βˆ ∈ (0, 1) and δˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that if β ∈ (βˆ, 1) and
δ ∈ (0, δˆ), then W ′(γ) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
Focusing on Case 3 of this Corollary, the following figure shows how the
multiplicity of steady-states is affected by a variation of α. The curve ∆(γ)−
Ω(γ) is going up when α increases. This illustrates the comparative statics for
the lower and higher BGPs γ∗1 and γ
∗
2 .
∆(γ)− Ω(γ)
↑α
γ∗1 γ
∗
2
γsupγinf
γ0
Figure 2: Multiplicity of steady-states and comparative statics.
We now briefly explain how we can understand the effect of α on these two
steady states. As we have seen previously, the coexistence of the two steady
states can be explained focusing on the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government. There is an excess of the tax revenue and debt emission with
respect to public spendings and debt reimbursement when γ is either lower
than γ∗1 or larger than γ
∗
2 , whereas the opposite is true when γ is between γ
∗
1
and γ∗2 . To understand the effect of α, recall that any BGP is characterized by
R > γ and the difference between debt reimbursement and debt emission per
unit of GDP is measured by α(R−γ). We immediately conclude that following
any increase of the ratio of debt-to-GDP α, the regions with a surplus of public
funds shrink, meaning that γ∗1 goes down, while γ
∗
2 goes up.
The comparative statics results of Corollary 1 provide quite different con-
clusions than the empirical results of Reinhart and Rogoff [22]. The relation-
ship between debt and the growth rate indeed strongly depends on both the
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level of the ratio of debt-to-GDP and the level of the tax rate. First, the
growth rate is always a decreasing function of the share of debt as a propor-
tion of GDP when this share is small enough. Second, for intermediary values
of α, multiple steady-states arise and the lower growth factor is negatively
affected by α while the higher one is positively affected. And third, above a
treshold level α̂, and when the tax rate is large enough, the unique long-run
growth rate becomes an increasing function of α. These results suggest a com-
plex relationship between debt and growth in line with the recent literature
surveyed by Panizza and Presbitero [20]. Moreover, they provide a theoretical
justification for the positive correlation exhibited by Minea and Parent [13]
with large enough debt-to-GDP ratios.
Our results then show that the negative impact of debt on growth as ex-
hibited by Reinhart and Rogoff [22] and some of the recent literature has to
be taken with caution. Above the threshold value α, when multiplicity holds,
they only get part of the story as they miss the second possible equilibrium
growth rate, which is an increasing function of α, and thus the possible strong
impact of agents’ expectations that select the long run equilibrium. As a re-
sult, they miss the fact that when the tax rate and the share of debt over
GDP are high enough, a quite large amount of public good can be financed
and increasing debt allows to boost even more the production process through
the productive externality. The growth factor increases as a result. The fact
that this positive impact is associated to a high enough tax rate can be linked
to the concept of “debt tolerance” formulated by Reinhart et al. [23] that
characterizes countries with strong fiscal structures, i.e. able to raise a large
amount of taxes (see also Collard et al. [4]-[5]).
Corollary 1 also shows that along a long-run balanced growth path, welfare
is an increasing function of the stationary growth factor γ. This holds whatever
the degree of the public good externality in the utility. We then exhibit a first
important trade-off associated with self-fulfilling expectations. We show indeed
that depending on the long-run equilibrium selected by agents’ expectations,
increasing the share of debt as a proportion of GDP may have a positive or a
negative impact on both the growth rate and welfare.
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4 Effect of debt in the short run: Sunspot fluc-
tuations and global indeterminacy
Focusing on the stability properties of the steady-states, we analyse now
whether the ratio of debt-to-GDP is destabilizing, through the occurrence of
local indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. As we have seen, two steady-states
may coexist. Hence, in order to simplify the local stability analysis and to fo-
cus on a precise steady-state, we first provide a normalization procedure of a
BGP.
4.1 A normalized steady-state
In order to get long run positive growth, we want to focus on the existence
of a steady-state value of γ which is larger than 1. To simplify this analysis,
we use the constant A to get the existence of a normalized steady-state γ∗ >
1. This procedure is useful to ensure that γ∗ remains invariant with respect
to parameters’ changes, in particular the share α of debt over GDP. This
invariance will allow us to provide a bifurcation analysis in order to study how
the dynamical properties of the steady-state are affected when α is modified.
As shown in the following Proposition, this property is obtained by choosing
adequately the value of A that will adjust accordingly to keep γ∗ constant.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, let θ − η < β. Then there exists γ ∈
[1, γsup) such that any given value γ
∗ ∈ (γ, γsup) is an admissible invariant
solution of equation (13) if and only if α ∈ (0, αMax) and A = A
∗ with
αMax =
τ
γ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
−1
)(> α̂) and A∗ =
[
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
]s
[
τ−αγ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
−1
)]1−s (> Â) (19)
Proof. See Appendix 7.5.
We may then easily characterize the stability properties of the normalized
steady-state by linearizing the dynamic system (11) around the steady-state
(x∗, γ∗) with x∗ as given by (12).
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, let θ − η < β, A = A∗, α ∈ (0, αMax) and
γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup). The characteristic polynomial is given by P (λ) ≡ λ
2−Tλ+D =
0, where:
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D =
(
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
)
B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
+ B1(α)d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
≡ D (α)
T = 1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
+ [B1(α)+B3]d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
+ B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
≡ T (α)
(20)
with
d∗(α) =
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) [
1− τ + αγ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)]
+ 1− δ − γ∗ ≥ 0
B1(α) = η −
θ
d∗(α)
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) [
1− s− τ + αγ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)]
B2(α) = sτ + αγ
∗
(
1− sγ
∗θ−η−1
β
)
+ α(1− s)γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β
> 0
B3 = (1− s)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η
> 0
Proof. See Appendix 7.6.
As explained at the end of Section 2, our dynamical system (11) has no
predetermined variable. Therefore, local determinacy is obtained if the steady-
state is totally unstable (a source). In this case, there is no transitional dy-
namics and the equilibrium jumps on the steady-state from date 0. On the
contrary, when the steady-state is either a saddle-point or totally stable (a
sink), there is local indeterminacy with the existence of a continuum of equi-
librium paths. As a result, sunspot fluctuations also occur.
We show now that the stability properties of the normalized steady-state
crucially depend on the value of the ratio of debt-to-GDP.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, let θ − η < β, A = A∗ and γ∗ ∈
(γ, γsup). Then there exist δ¯ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1), α¯ ∈ (0, αMax) and Θ¯ ∈ (0, β)
such that if δ ∈ (0, δ¯), β ∈ (β, 1) and θ−η ∈ (0, Θ¯), the normalized steady-state
γ∗ is:
i) a source, i.e. locally determinate, when α ∈ (0, α¯),
ii) a saddle-point, i.e. locally indeterminate when α ∈ (α¯, αMax).
Proof. See Appendix 7.7.
When the share of debt over GDP is large enough, the local indeterminacy
of the steady-state implies that there exist expectation-driven fluctuations.
While Corollary 1 showed that a higher level of debt over GDP may foster
the long run growth rate, this result exhibits a negative impact based on the
fact that, over a precise threshold, public debt has a destabilizing role on
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the economy and leads to the existence of fluctuations based on self-fulfilling
prophecies. As a result, debt may generate endogenous recessions associated to
recurrent decreases of growth with the possible occurrence of negative growth
rates. Note also that our results are in line with Sutherland et al. [25] since
large debt fosters macroeconomic instability.
It is worth mentioning that Proposition 4 provides quite different conclu-
sions than models without public debt like Cazzavillan [3]. The assumption
θ − η > 0 implies that the homogeneity of the utility function is lower than
one and restricts our attention to a weak public good externality in the utility
function. Proposition 4 shows that local indeterminacy may arise when the
share of debt over GDP is large enough, even without externality in utility
(η = 0). On the contrary, Cazzavillan [3] proves that local indeterminacy re-
quires a sufficiently large externality in utility, i.e. a degree of homogeneity
larger than one. This confirms that the existence of sunspot fluctuations is
here fundamentally derived from a large enough debt. Moreover, contrary to
the conclusions of Minea and Villieu [15], considering the debt-to-GDP ratio
as a policy instrument does not necessarily preclude the indeterminacy of the
BGP.
4.2 A second steady-state
We have shown in Proposition 3 that the normalized steady-state is obtained
if α ∈ (0, αMax) and A = A
∗, with αMax > α̂ and A
∗ > Â. Following case
2 in Proposition 2, a second admissible steady-state may arise depending on
the value of α. Although some general conditions for the existence of a second
steady-state have been stated in Proposition 2, we need here to complete these
conditions as we start from the existence of a normalized steady-state that
remains constant for any α ∈ [0, αMax). We now locate precisely the second
steady-state γ˜ with respect to γ∗ and 1. The configuration with γ˜ < 1 is clearly
associated to endogenous recession. We derive the following Proposition:
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1, let θ − η < β, A = A∗ and γ∗ ∈
(γ, γsup). Then there exist αˆ ∈ (α¯, αMax), α ∈ (0, α¯) and α1 ∈ (α¯, αˆ) such
that when α ∈ (α, αˆ), there is a second admissible steady-state γ˜ ∈ (γinf , γsup)
which satisfies:
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i) γ˜ ∈ (γ∗, γsup) when α ∈ (α, α¯),
ii) γ˜ ∈ (1, γ∗) when α ∈ (α¯, α1),
iii) γ˜ ∈ (γinf , 1) when α ∈ (α1, αˆ).
Proof. See Appendix 7.8.
Proposition 5 then shows, in accordance with Proposition 2, that there exist
two admissible steady-states as long as the share α of public debt over GDP
is large enough but not too big. Moreover, when α is too low, the second
steady-state γ˜ is not admissible as it is larger than γsup.
Considering Proposition 4, we immediately derive the following conclusion:
Corollary 2. Under Assumption 1, let θ − η < β, A = A∗, γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup),
δ ∈ (0, δ¯), β ∈ (β, 1) and θ − η ∈ (0, Θ¯). Then the normalized steady-state γ∗
is globally determinate if and only if α ∈ [0, α).
As α < α¯, the normalized steady-state γ∗ is indeed unique and locally deter-
minate when α ∈ [0, α). This result is again in line with Sutherland et al.
[25] since low debt prevents the occurrence of business cycles. However, as α
increases from α, γ˜ becomes admissible with γ˜ > γ∗, until α = α¯ and γ˜ = γ∗.
If α increases again, then γ˜ < γ∗ until α becomes too large so that γ˜ is no
longer admissible as it is lower than γinf .
As we have normalized the steady-state γ∗ which exists and remains con-
stant for any α ∈ [0, αMax), we may immediately derive the local stability
properties of the second steady-state γ˜:
Corollary 3. Under Assumption 1, let A = A∗, γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup), β ∈ (β, 1),
δ ∈ (0, δ¯) and θ − η ∈ (0, Θ¯). Then the second admissible steady-state γ˜ ∈
(γinf , γsup) is:
i) a saddle-point, i.e. locally indeterminate if α ∈ (α, α¯),
ii) a source, i.e. locally determinate, if α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
It follows that when α ∈ (α, αˆ), global indeterminacy arises.
Propositions 4 and 5 together with Corollary 3 show that the ratio of debt-
to-GDP has a strong impact on the stability properties of the equilibrium,
in particular when multiple balanced growth paths occur. In this case (α >
α), we exhibit an important trade-off as the largest steady-state is always
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locally indeterminate, i.e. characterized by expectation-driven fluctuations,
while the lowest steady-state is always locally determinate. The larger the
ratio of debt-to-GDP is, the lower the locally determinate steady-state. It can
even be less than one, i.e. characterized by an economic recession. Because of
multiplicity, there is also a global indeterminacy suggesting that depending on
agents’ expectations, the actual equilibrium may converge towards the lowest
or the highest growth factor, eventually with large fluctuations. As we know
from Corollary 1 that the indeterminate steady state has the highest welfare,
global indeterminacy can have strong implications in terms of welfare loss if
agents coordinate their expectations on the lowest growth factor.
These results, that put a strong emphasis on self-fulfilling prophecies, rein-
force the consistency of our analysis, already highlighted in the previous sec-
tion, with the empirical facts exhibited by the recent literature. As shown by
Sutherland et al. [25], increasing the ratio of debt-to-GDP affects the business
cycle of countries leading to the existence of expectation-driven fluctuations.
Depending on agents’ beliefs, the impact on growth can be negative in the
short or longer term through the possible occurrence of recessions. Moreover,
as suggested by Panizza and Presbitero [20], there exist some non-linear and
threshold effects associated to the existence of multiple equilibria and global
indeterminacy. Finally, the existence of self-fulfilling prophecies can explain
the fact that while some countries have a potential maximal sustainable debt
ratio higher than their actual one, their perceived default risk can increase
dramatically without any fundamental reason (see Collard et al. [4]-[5]).
4.3 Economic interpretations
To provide an intuition for these results, we recall that local indeterminacy
means that several dynamic paths converge to a BGP and the selection of
one dynamic path depends on agents’ expectations. In other words, a way of
providing an intuition for local indeterminacy of the largest BGP is to explain
whether expectations may be self-fulfilling.
Let us consider the intertemporal budget constraint of the government and
assume that the households expect a larger growth factor at the next period.
According to the constraint on debt, they expect a larger level of future debt
emission. This broader funding opportunity may be used to either reimburse
20
the cost of debt or enhance productive public spendings. At this stage, we
note that, especially for θ−η low enough, the larger the growth rate, the lower
the difference between R and γ, as measured by γθ−η/β − γ. We derive that
along a BGP with a high enough level of growth, the difference between the
cost of debt reimbursement and debt emission as measured by R− γ is lower,
meaning that a larger share of government revenue is devoted to productive
public spendings. This raises the ratio G/k, which leads to an increase of the
interest rate r. Since growth comes from a Barro-type [1] formulation, current
growth raises. Therefore, a higher expected growth rate induces larger current
growth, meaning that expectations are self-fulfilling.
It is important to note that this does not happen if one focuses on a BGP
with a too low growth factor. Indeed, in such a case, a too large share of taxa-
tion and debt emission is used to debt reimbursement, rather than to improve
the level of productive public spending. Finally, our mechanism requires a
sufficiently large ratio of public debt-to-GDP. This allows public spendings to
strongly depend on the expected level of production. Otherwise, expectations
would not sufficiently affect current public spendings and growth.
5 A simple calibration on OECD countries
Let us now confront our theoretical conclusions to the recent experiences of
OECD countries with a simple numerical exercise. Using a standard calibration
consistent with quarterly data, we assume that (δ, β) = (0.025, 0.98). Following
Gruber [11], Mulligan [16], Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio [26] who provide
estimates for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption larger
than unity and smaller than 2, we assume that θ = 0.54. Concerning the size
η of the public good externality into the utility function there is of course no
direct empirical evidence. However, Ni [17] provides some estimations of the
substitutability of government purchases for private consumption that support
the interval η ∈ (0.22, 0.44). We will consider in the following η = 0.4 so that
θ − η = 0.14. With these values, the maximum admissible growth factor is
γsup ≈ 1.02377.
The following Table provides numbers in 2014 for the fiscal pressure τ , the
share of capital income into GDP s and the share of gross debt into GDP α.
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Concerning the growth factor of GDP, as γ∗ is the long-run value, we consider
the average over 2010 − 2014 for the main OECD countries in order to avoid
the recession that occurred in 2009.8
Countries τ s α γ10−14
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (average 2010-14)
France 45.3 0.31 95 1.0104
Germany 37.6 0.31 74.7 1.0196
Greece 33.8 0.4 177.1 0.952
Ireland 28.3 0.43 109.7 1.0144
Italy 44.4 0.31 132.1 0.9948
Japan 28.6 0.4 230 1.0152
Portugal 32.5 0.36 130.2 0.9908
Spain 32.9 0.39 97.7 0.995
UK 35.2 0.3 89.4 1.0174
US 24.3 0.36 101.5 1.022
Table 1: Main statistics in 2014 (Source: Eurostat and OECD)
As can be seen, there are huge variations of the fiscal pressure τ and the
ratio of debt-to-GDP α across countries. Also, while the share of capital income
into GDP is most commonly fixed at 0.3, there are quite large differences across
countries with a value often larger than 0.3. For each illustration we will use
the parameters’ values of the country we want to focus on. Note that four
countries are characterized on average by a recession over the last five years.
The numbers of Table 1 implies for all countries that the normalized steady
state γ∗ corresponds to the higher BGP. Depending on the value of the share
α, there is thus the possibility of a second BGP lower than γ∗. Indeed, the
critical values for the share α are provided in the following Table:
8The critical bound αMax reaches unrealistically large values (larger than 20). In practice
we focus on some interval α ∈ [0, 3) to be able to cover the case of Japan.
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Countries α α α¯ α1 αˆ
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
France 95 69.1 70.3 71.3 179
Germany 74.7 56.7 57 58.5 148.8
Greece 177.1 81 86.6 82.7 133.8
Ireland 109.7 71.8 72.4 73.3 112
Italy 132.1 69.2 71.8 71.3 175.8
Japan 230 64.2 64.7 65.7 113
Portugal 130.2 63.4 65.8 65 128
Spain 97.7 72.3 74.4 74 130
UK 89.4 50.8 51.2 52.4 139
US 101.5 45.7 45.8 47 96.2
Table 2: Critical values of α
This Table immediately shows that depending on whether α ∈ (α¯, αˆ) or α > αˆ,
the OECD countries can be splited into two sets: a first one in which there
exists a second negative long run growth rate, i.e. associated to an endogenous
recession, and a second set in which the normalized growth rate the unique
admissible steady state. The first set is composed of France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Spain and UK while the second set contains Greece, Japan, Portugal
and the US. Moreover, in each of these two sets, we can define two sub-sets
depending on whether the normalized growth rate is positive or negative.
As a first illustration consider the case of France with a quite strong fiscal
pressure corresponding to τ = 0.453. We choose a normalized steady-state
γ∗ = 1.0104. As α ∈ (α1, αˆ), we conclude that γ
∗ is locally indeterminate
and that global indeterminacy also arises as there exists a second steady-state
γ˜ = 0.8342 corresponding to a recession which is saddle-point stable. Our
results then show that there are quite large fluctuations associated to self-
fulfilling believes that can be related to the recent macroeconomic instability
observed in France over the last five years. This suggests also that depending
on the expectations of agents, there is a possibility of a large recession if there is
a coordination on the low steady-state. Very similar conclusions are obtained
for Germany, with γ∗ = 1.0196 and γ˜ = 0.854, Ireland, with γ∗ = 1.0144
and γ˜ = 0.7247, or UK, with γ∗ = 1.0174 and γ˜ = 0.762, suggesting that
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even though the ratio of debt-to-GDP is much smaller, the possible occurrence
of a strong recession is not ruled-out. It is worth noting that this recession
can be stronger for Ireland and UK than for France or Germany as their
second growth factor is significantly lower. It is also interesting to remark
that for France and Ireland, a decrease of their debt ratio in order to meet the
Maastricht constraint would be enough to ensure α < α and thus to guarantee
the uniqueness of the long-run growth equilibrium without any fluctuations.
For Germany and UK, it would be necessary to satisfy a slightly stronger
constraint than the one imposed by Maastricht. It is finally important to note
that, although their macroeconomic indicators are quite different, in particular
concerning the unemployment rate, France and Germany, and more generally
all the countries of this sub-set, face a similar risk of important recession due
to a too large debt.
Spain, with γ∗ = 0.995 and γ˜ = 0.797, and Italy, with γ∗ = 0.9948 and
γ˜ = 0.741, are also in a similar configuration except that both steady states
are lower than one. As the normalized BGP is lower than 1, we have α¯ > α1.
We get α ∈ (α¯, αˆ) leading to a local indeterminacy for γ∗, determinacy for γ˜
and thus the existence of global indeterminacy with the possibility of a strong
recession if there is a coordination on the low steady-state. But here, short-
run fluctuations are also characterized by some strong instability due to the
high occurrence of recessions and booms. The configuration is more difficult
than for the first sub-set of countries since recessions are here more frequent,
but again, a significant decrease of their debt would allow these countries to
improve a lot their situation: lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio around 70−71%
for Italy (thus a decrease of 45%) and 73% for Spain (thus a decrease of 25%)
would increase the lower equilibrium growth factor up to a value significantly
larger than 1 and would allow an eventual coordination of expectations on this
growth equilibrium. Moreover, meeting the Maastricht constraint would allow
both countries to stabilize their economy.
Consider now the case of the US. We focus on the average value γ∗ = 1.022.
Contrary to France, as the share of debt over GDP α is larger than αˆ there is a
unique steady-state which is locally indeterminate. There are still expectation-
driven fluctuations but the possibility of a strong recession is ruled-out as there
is no global indeterminacy. Similar conclusions are obtained for Japan with
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γ∗ = 1.0152. It is worth noting that both countries would need to do strong
efforts of debt reduction in order to eliminate all possibility of macroeconomic
instability: a decrease of more than 50% for the US and around 75% for Japan.
In the case of Greece with γ∗ = 0.9523, we find as in the US that α > αˆ
and the unique steady-state γ∗ is locally indeterminate with expectation-driven
fluctuations but in this case this is related to instability into a strong recession.
The same kind of configuration occurs with Portugal which is characterized by
γ∗ = 0.9908 and α > αˆ, but with the possibility of growth factors larger than
1 during some quarters, as this was the case of the last few years. For both
countries, a significant reduction of their debt would allow them to improve
a lot their situation: decreasing the debt-to-GDP ratio by a half driving it to
around 82% for Greece and 64% for Portugal would lead to the existence of
a second equilibrium growth factor significantly larger than 1. The existence
of large fluctuations would not be ruled out but the occurrence of optimistic
expectations could allow a coordination of the high growth equilibrium. More-
over, here again, meeting the Maastricht constraint would allow both countries
to stabilize completely their economy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a simple Barro-type [1] endogenous growth
model where public spending is financed through taxes on income and public
debt, and is useful because it improves households’ utility of consumption and
production as externalities. The ratio of debt over GDP is fixed and is used as
a policy parameter by the government as recently in many European countries.
We have proved that when debt is a large enough proportion of GDP,
two distinct BGPs may co-exist, one being indeterminate. We have exhibited
two types of important trade-off associated with self-fulfilling expectations.
First, we have shown that the lowest BGP is always a decreasing function of
the ratio of debt/GDP while the highest one is an increasing function. As a
result, depending on the BGP selected by agents’ expectations, the relationship
between debt and growth is not necessarily negative.
Second, local and global indeterminacy may arise and self-fulfilling expec-
tations appear as a crucial ingredient to understand the impact of debt on
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growth and on macroeconomic fluctuations. There is clearly a trade-off be-
tween welfare and macroeconomic fluctuations: the highest BGP, which pro-
vides the highest welfare, is always locally indeterminate while the lowest is
always locally determinate. Our results then show non-trivial effects of debt
on growth and macroeconomic fluctuations. Depending on the expectations
of agents, large fluctuations associated to self-fulfilling believes may occur and
be associated at the same time with welfare losses if there is a coordination on
the low steady-state.
Our paper then provides a theoretical analysis that improves our under-
standing of the complex non-linear and threshold effects between public debt,
growth and macroeconomic fluctuations. We have also discussed the impli-
cations of our findings for the main OECD countries considering numerical
illustrations based on realistic calibrations for the size of debt, the growth rate
and the main fundamentals. We have shown that the existence of multiple
equilibria and global indeterminacy can provide a basis for understanding the
recent experiences of many OECD countries relating the occurrence of endoge-
nous recessions and macroeconomic instability to self-fulfilling expectations.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Substituting (12) in d(γ), we get:
d(γ) = γ
θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
−
[
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βAs(1−τ)
] 1
1−s
+ 1− δ − γ (21)
We derive that d(γinf) = 1− δ − [β(1− δ)]
1
θ−η > 0. Moreover,
d(γsup) =
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
s(1−τ)
[
1− 1
A
1
1−s
(
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
s(1−τ)
) s
1−s
− s(1− τ)
]
> 0 (22)
if and only if A > A1(τ), with
A1(τ) ≡
[β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)]s
[s(1−τ)]s[1−s(1−τ)]1−s
(23)
Note that A′1(τ) > 0. Since τ < 1 − s, we get A1(1 − s) > A1(τ) for any
τ < 1− s with
A1(1− s) =
[β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)]s
s2s[(1−s)(1+s)]1−s
≡ Â1
(24)
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Computing now the first and second derivatives of d(γ), we get:
d′(γ) = (θ − η) γ
θ−η−1
βs(1−τ)
[
1− 1
(1−s)A
1
1−s
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) s
1−s
]
− 1
d′′(γ) = (θ − η)(θ − η − 1) γ
θ−η−2
βs(1−τ)
[
1− 1
(1−s)A
1
1−s
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) s
1−s
]
− (θ − η)2
(
γθ−η−1
βs(1−τ)
)2
s
(1−s)2A
1
1−s
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) 2s−1
1−s
(25)
Since θ − η < 1, we easily derive that d′′(γ) < 0 for all γ ∈ (γinf , γsup) if the
term between brackets on the first line of the expression of d′′(γ) is positive.
As this term is a decreasing function of γ we conclude that it is positive for
all γ ∈ (γinf , γsup) if it is positive when evaluated at γsup. This is obtained if
A > A2(τ), with
A2(τ) ≡
[β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)]s
[s(1−τ)]s(1−s)1−s
(26)
Since τ < 1− s, we get A2(1− s) > A2(τ) for any τ < 1− s with
A2(1− s) =
[β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)]s
s2s(1−s)1−s
≡ Â2
(27)
and Â2 > Â1. Let Â2 = Â. We conclude that if A > Â, then d
′′(γ) < 0 for
all γ ∈ (γinf , γsup). Therefore, the concavity of d(γ) over (γinf , γsup) together
with d(γinf) > 0 and d(γsup) > 0 ensure that when A > Â, d(γ) > 0 for all
γ ∈ (γinf , γsup) and all τ < 1− s.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
When α = 0, we derive from equation (13) that Ω(γ) = τ is constant and
∆(γ) = 1
A
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βAs(1−τ)
) s
1−s
is increasing from ∆(γinf) = 0 to
∆(γsup) =
1
A
[
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
As(1−τ)
] s
1−s
There exists a unique steady-state γ∗ ∈ (γinf , γsup) if and only if the in-
equality ∆(γsup) > τ is satisfied, i.e.
1
A
[
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
As
] s
1−s
> τ(1− τ)
s
1−s ≡ ϕ(τ) (28)
ϕ(τ) is increasing for all τ < 1−s, and reaches its maximum value for τ = 1−s,
meaning that ϕ(τ) < ϕ(1− s) = (1− s)s
s
1−s . Since we need to assume A > Â
27
in order to ensure d(γ) > 0, where Â is given by (27), it follows that inequality
cannot hold when τ = 1 − s. As it obviously holds when τ = 0, we conclude
that there exists τˆ ∈ (0, 1 − s) such that ∆(γsup) > τ for τ ∈ (0, τˆ), whereas
∆(γsup) < τ for τ ∈ (τˆ , 1− s).
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
By direct inspection of equation (13), we see that Ω(γ) is linearly increasing
in γ, with Ω′(γ) = α > 0, and
∆′(γ) = (θ − η)γθ−η−1
[
s
A(1−s)
[γθ−η−β(1−δ)]
2s−1
1−s
[βAs(1−τ)]
s
1−s
+ α
β
]
> 0 (29)
Using s ∈ (0, 1/2), we also easily derive that ∆(γ) is concave, i.e. ∆′′(γ) < 0.
Since ∆(γinf) = α(1− δ) and Ω(γinf) = τ +α[β(1− δ)]
1
θ−η , we have ∆(γinf) <
(>)Ω(γinf) if and only if α < (>)α̂, with:
α̂ ≡ τ
1−δ−[β(1−δ)]
1
θ−η
(30)
Similarly, using
∆(γsup) =
1
A
[
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
As(1−τ)
] s
1−s
+ αβ
1
θ−η−1
and Ω(γsup) = τ + αβ
1
θ−η−1 , we get ∆(γsup) > Ω(γsup) if and only if:
1
A
[
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
As
] s
1−s
> τ(1− τ)
s
1−s ≡ ϕ(τ) (31)
Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, we conclude that
when A > Â, there exists τˆ ∈ (0, 1 − s) such that ∆(γsup) > Ω(γsup) for
τ ∈ (0, τˆ), whereas ∆(γsup) < Ω(γsup) for τ ∈ (τˆ , 1− s).
We can then prove case 1 of the Proposition. Assume first that α < α̂,
i.e. ∆(γinf) < Ω(γinf). The existence of a unique steady-state γ
∗ ∈ (γinf , γsup)
is ensured if ∆(γsup) > Ω(γsup) i.e. if A > Â and τ ∈ (0, τˆ). Assume now
that α > α̂, i.e. ∆(γinf ) > Ω(γinf). The existence of a unique steady-state
γ∗ ∈ (γinf , γsup) is ensured if ∆(γsup) < Ω(γsup) i.e. if A > Â and τ ∈ (τˆ , 1−s).
Let us finally focus on case 2 where α < α̂, i.e. ∆(γinf) < Ω(γinf ), and
A > Â with τ ∈ (τˆ , 1 − s), i.e. ∆(γsup) < Ω(γsup). There are two steady-
states if there exists γ̂ ∈ (γinf , γsup) defined by ∆
′(γ̂) = Ω′(γ̂) that satisfies
∆(γ̂) > Ω(γ̂). The equality ∆′(γ) = Ω′(γ) is equivalent to
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g(γ) ≡ (θ − η) γ
θ−η−1s
βA(1−s)
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βAs(1−τ)
) 2s−1
1−s 1
As(1−τ)
= α
[
1− (θ − η)γ
θ−η−1
β
]
≡ h(γ)
Note that g′(γ) < 0 and h′(γ) > 0. Moreover, we have
g(γinf) = +∞ > h(γinf) = α
[
1− (θ − η) [β(1−δ)]
θ−η−1
θ−η
β
]
Similarly, we have h(γsup) = α[1− (θ − η)] and
g(γsup) = (θ − η)
s
(1−s)A
1
1−s
(
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
s(1−τ)
) s
1−s
1
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
Since A > Â, we get
g(γsup) <
(θ−η)s
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
Therefore, we get g(γsup) < h(γsup) if
(θ−η)s
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
< α[1− (θ − η)]
or equivalently
α > (θ−η)s[
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
]
[1−(θ−η)]
≡ α
It follows that there exists Θ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that α < α̂ if θ − η ∈ (0, Θ˜).
Let us then assume that θ − η ∈ (0, Θ˜) and α ∈ (α, α̂). We know that
there exists γ̂ ∈ (γinf , γsup) such that ∆
′(γ̂) = Ω′(γ̂). We need finally to show
that ∆(γ̂) > Ω(γ̂). When α = α we get ∆′(γsup) = Ω
′(γsup) and there is no
steady-state. When α = α̂, we get ∆(γinf ) = Ω(γinf ) and ∆(γsup) < Ω(γsup).
In this case there exists two steady-states but the lower one is equal to γinf .
Therefore, since ∂∆(γ)/∂α−∂Ω(γ)/∂α = γθ−η/β−γ > 0, it follows that there
exists a unique α ∈ (α, α̂) such that there are two steady-states γ∗1 and γ
∗
2 for
α ∈ (α, α̂).
7.4 Proof of Corollary 1
To determine the comparative statics of each type of steady-state with respect
to α, we differentiate equation (13) to get:
dγ∗
dα
= ∂∆(γ
∗)/∂α−∂Ω(γ∗)/∂α
Ω′(γ∗)−∆′(γ∗)
(32)
Since ∂∆(γ)/∂α − ∂Ω(γ)/∂α = γθ−η/β − γ > 0, the sign of dγ∗/dα is given
by the sign of Ω′(γ∗) − ∆′(γ∗), i.e. the difference between the slopes of Ω(γ)
and ∆(γ) evaluated at each steady-state. Using Proposition 2, we easily derive
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that dγ∗/dα < 0 in case 1(a), dγ∗/dα > 0 in case 1(b), and dγ∗1/dα < 0 and
dγ∗2/dα > 0 in case 3(b).
Consider now the expression of W (γ) as given by (18). We get:
W ′(γ) =
k
1−(θ−η)
0 d(γ)
−θx(γ)η
1−θ
[
(1−θ)d′(γ)+ηd(γ)
x′ (γ)
x(γ)
]
[1−βγ1−(θ−η)]+[1−(θ−η)]βγ−(θ−η)d(γ)
[1−βγ1−(θ−η)]
2
with
d′(γ) = (θ − η) γ
θ−η−1
βs(1−τ)
[
1− 1
(1−s)A
1
1−s
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) s
1−s
]
− 1
x′(γ) = 1
(1−s)A
1
1−s
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) s
1−s
(θ − η) γ
θ−η−1
βs(1−τ)
> 0
so that
W ′(γ) >
k
1−(θ−η)
0 d(γ)
−θx(γ)η
1−θ
(1−θ)d′(γ)[1−βγ1−(θ−η)]+[1−(θ−η)]βγ−(θ−η)d(γ)
[1−βγ1−(θ−η)]
2
We have shown in the proof of Lemma 1 that when A > Â, d′(γ) is a monotone
decreasing function with d′(γinf) > d
′(γ) > d′(γsup). It follows that
W ′(γ) >
k
1−(θ−η)
0 d(γ)
−θx(γ)η
1−θ
(1−θ)d′(γsup)[1−βγ1−(θ−η)]+[1−(θ−η)]βγ−(θ−η)d(γ)
[1−βγ1−(θ−η)]
2
with
d′(γsup) =
(θ−η)
s(1−τ)
[
1− 1
(1−s)A
1
1−s
(
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
s(1−τ)
) s
1−s
]
− 1 ≡ Ψ(β, δ)− 1
and Ψ(β, δ) > 0. Let us denote
f(γ) ≡ (1− θ)d′(γsup)
[
1− βγ1−(θ−η)
]
+ [1− (θ − η)]βγ−(θ−η)d(γ)
Using γ ∈ (γinf , γsup), assume first that d
′(γsup) ≥ 0. We derive
f(γ) > (1− θ)
[
d′(γsup)
(
1− βγ
1−(θ−η)
sup
)
+ βγ
−(θ−η)
sup d(γ)
]
> (1− θ)β
1
1−(θ−η) > 0
for any γ ∈ (γinf , γsup). Assume now that d
′(γsup) < 0. We derive
f(γ) > (1− θ)
[
d′(γsup)
(
1− βγ
1−(θ−η)
inf
)
+ βγ
−(θ−η)
sup d(γ)
]
> (1− θ)
{
Ψ(β, δ)
(
1− β
1
θ−η (1− δ)
1−(θ−η)
θ−η
)
− 1 + β
1
θ−η (1− δ)
1−(θ−η)
θ−η
+ β
1
1−(θ−η)d(γ)
}
When β = 1 and δ = 0, we get
f(γ) > (1− θ)d(γ) > 0
Therefore, there exist βˆ ∈ (0, 1) and δˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that if β ∈ (βˆ, 1) and
δ ∈ (0, δˆ), then f(γ) > 0 for any γ ∈ (γinf , γsup). The result follows.
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7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
A stationary solution γ∗ ∈ (1, γsup) satisfies equation (13) if
h(γ∗, α) ≡
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) s
1−s
A
−1
1−s −
[
τ − αγ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)]
= 0 (33)
This equation can hold only if α < αMax, with:
αMax =
τ
γ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
−1
) (34)
Note that if γ∗ = γinf then αMax = α̂. Moreover, as γ
∗ > 1, straightforward
computations show that if θ − η < β, αMax is an increasing function of γ
∗. It
follows that for any γ∗ ∈ (1, γsup), αMax > α̂.
Let us then assume that θ − η < β and α < αMax. There is a unique
A = A∗ solving equation (33), where A∗ is given by (19). We immediately see
that limγ→γinf A
∗ = 0, whereas
limγ→γsup A
∗ =
[
β
1
θ−η−1−(1−δ)
]s
ss(1−τ)sτ1−s
≡ A∗γsup
(35)
Since for any τ < 1 − s we have A∗γsup > Â, we conclude that there exists
γˆ ∈ (γinf , γsup) such that when γ
∗ ∈ (γˆ, γsup), A
∗ > Â. Let us then denote
γ = max{1, γˆ} and let us choose γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup) for which A
∗ > Â. Since Â > A˜,
it follows from Lemma 1 that d(γ∗) > 0.
7.6 Proof of Lemma 2
Linearizing the dynamic system (11) around the normalized steady-state, we
obtain:
θγ∗
d∗(α)
∆γt+1
γ∗
+ [B1(α) +B3]
∆xt+1
x∗
=
[
θ − η + θγ
∗
d∗(α)
]
∆γt
γ∗
+B1(α)
∆xt
x∗
αγ∗(1− s)∆xt+1
x∗
= −αγ∗∆γt
γ∗
+B2(α)
∆xt
x∗
with
d∗(α) =
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) [
1− τ + αγ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)]
+ 1− δ − γ∗ ≥ 0
B1(α) = η −
θ
d∗(α)
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
) [
1− s− τ + αγ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)]
B2(α) = sτ + αγ
∗
(
1− sγ
∗θ−η−1
β
)
+ α(1− s)γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β
B3 = (1− s)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η
> 0
(36)
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Note that B2(α) can also be written as
B2(α) = sτ + α
[
γ∗ − (1− s)(1− δ) + (1− 2s)γ
∗θ−η
β
]
> 0
We then derive the following linear system(
∆γt+1
γ∗
∆xt+1
x∗
)
= J
(
∆γt
γ∗
∆xt
x∗
)
with
J =
(
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
+ [B1(α)+B3]d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
B1(α)d∗(α)
θγ∗
− B2(α)[B1(α)+B3]d
∗(α)
θαγ∗2(1−s)
− 1
1−s
B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
)
Since T and D represent respectively the trace and the determinant of J , the
result follows after straightforward simplifications.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 4
To study the local stability properties of the normalized steady-state γ∗, we
need to establish two technical Lemmas. Consider indeed equation (13) with
A = A∗ that can be simplified as follows
h(γ, α) =
[
τ − αγ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)] (
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
) s
1−s
−
[
τ − αγ
(
γθ−η−1
β
− 1
)]
= 0
(37)
We obviously get h(γ∗, α) = 0. The first Lemma characterizes the slope of
the function h(γ, α) when γ = γ∗. In the following we denote h′1(γ, α) =
∂h(γ, α)/∂γ and h′2(γ, α) = ∂h(γ, α)/∂α.
Lemma 7.1. Assume that θ − η < β, A = A∗ and γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup). Then there
exists α¯ ∈ (0, αMax) such that
h′1(γ
∗, α) T 0 ⇔ α S α¯ (38)
Proof. Straightforward computations using the fact that h(γ, α) = 0 along
a steady-state yields
h′1(γ, α) =
τ(θ−η)s
1−s
γθ−η−1
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
−
α
{[
1−(θ−η)γ
θ−η−1
β
]
[γθ−η−β(1−δ)]+γθ−η
(
γθ−η−1
β
−1
)
(θ−η)s
1−s
}
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
Consider the term between braces multiplying α
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ϕ(γ) =
[
1− (θ − η)γ
θ−η−1
β
] [
γθ−η − β(1− δ)
]
+ γθ−η
(
γθ−η−1
β
− 1
)
(θ−η)s
1−s
We get ϕ(γ) > 0 if
(θ − η)γ
θ−η−1
β
< 1 ⇔ γ >
(
θ−η
β
) 1
1−(θ−η)
Under θ − η < β we get [(θ − η)/β]
1
1−(θ−η) < 1. Since γ∗ > 1, it follows that
h′1(γ
∗, α) T 0 if and only if α S α¯ with
α¯ =
τ(θ−η)s
1−s
γ∗θ−η−1[
1−(θ−η)γ
∗θ−η−1
β
]
[γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)]+γ∗θ−η
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
−1
)
(θ−η)s
1−s
(39)
Straightforward computations show that α¯ < αMax.
The second technical Lemma provides a property of the discriminant of the
characteristic polynomial that applies for any α ∈ [0, αMax).
Lemma 7.2. Assume that A = A∗ and γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup). Then there exist
Θ¯ ∈ (0, β), δ1 ∈ (0, 1) and β1 ∈ (0, 1) such that when θ− η ∈ (0, Θ¯), δ ∈ (0, δ1)
and β ∈ (β1, 1), both roots of the characteristic polynomial are real and positive
for any α ∈ [0, αMax).
Proof. Let us first compute the discriminant of the characteristic polynomial.
Straightforward computations give
∆ =
[
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
+ [B1(α)+B3]d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
+ B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
]2
− 4
[(
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
)
B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
+ B1(α)d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
]
Assume first that B1(α) ≥ 0. We then get B1(α)d
∗(α)α + θB2(α) > 0 and
∆ >
[
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
+ [B1(α)+B3]d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
+ B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
]2
− 4
(
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
)(
B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
+ B1(α)d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
)
>
[
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
+ [B3−B1(α)]d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
− B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
]2
+ 4 B3d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
[
B1(α)d∗(α)α+θB2(α)
θαγ∗(1−s)
]
> 0
Assume now that B1(α) < 0. We then get
∆ >
[
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
+ [B1(α)+B3]d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
+ B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
]2
− 4
(
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
)
B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
>
[
1 + (θ−η)d
∗(α)
θγ∗
+ [B1(α)+B3]d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
− B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
]2
+ 4 B2(α)
αγ∗(1−s)
[B1(α)+B3]d∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
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with
B1(α) +B3 =
θ
[
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β(1−τ)
+1−δ−γ∗
]
+d∗(α)
[
(1−s)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η
−(θ−η)
]
d∗(α)
(40)
Let us consider the term between brackets that is multiplied by θ. Obviously
this term is positive if and only if
γ∗θ−η
[
1− γ∗θ−η−1β(1− τ)
]
− β(1− δ)τ > 0
Since γ < γsup we get
1− γ∗θ−η−1β(1− τ) > 1− τ > 0
Moreover, since γ > γinf we get
γ∗θ−η
[
1− γ∗θ−η−1β(1− τ)
]
− β(1− δ)τ > β(1− δ)(1− τ)
[
1− γ∗θ−η−1β
]
> 0
It follows therefore that
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β(1−τ)
+ 1− δ − γ∗ > 0 (41)
for any γ ∈ (γinf , γsup).
Consider now equation (40) when θ − η = 0. We get
B1(α) +B3 =
θ[ 1−β(1−δ)β(1−τ) +1−δ−γ
∗]+d∗(α)(1−s)[1−β(1−δ)]
d∗(α)
with obviously
1−β(1−δ)
β(1−τ)
+ 1− δ − γ∗ > 0
Recalling that γ > γinf , it follows that B1(α)+B3 > 0 for any α ∈ [0, αMax) as
γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup). Therefore, for any given γ
∗ ∈ (γ, γsup), there exists Θ¯ ∈ (0, β],
such that when θ − η ∈ (0, Θ¯), B1(α) + B3 > 0 and thus ∆ > 0 for any
α ∈ [0, αMax).
Let us focus now on the sign of D(α) and T (α) as given by (20). Since
B1(α) + B3 > 0 and B2(α) > 0 for any α ∈ [0, αMax), we immediately get
T (α) > 0 for any α ∈ [0, αMax). To derive the sign of D(α), we need to study
the sign of B1(α)d
∗(α)α+ θB2(α). Obvious computations give
B1(α)d
∗(α)α + θB2(α) = −α
2(θ − η)γ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
+ α
{
η
[
γ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
βs
− 1
)
− (1−δ)(1−s)
s
]
+ θ
1−τ
[
γ∗
(
1− sγ
∗θ−η−1
β
)
− γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs
(1− s)2
− τ
[
γ∗
(
1− sγ
∗θ−η−1
β
)
− γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs
[1− s(1− s)]
] ]}
+ θsτ ≡ φ(α)
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The polynomial φ(α) is concave with φ(0) = θsτ > 0 and limα→∞ φ(α) = −∞,
so that if φ(αMax) > 0, then φ(α) > 0 for any α ∈ [0, αMax). When α = αMax,
we derive from Lemma 2:
d∗(αMax) =
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
)
+ 1− δ − γ∗ ≥ 0
B1(αMax) = η −
θ(1−s)
d∗(αMax)
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
)
B2(αMax) = (1− s)αMax
[
γ∗ + γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β
] (42)
so that
φ(αMax) = αMax
{
η
[
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
+ 1− δ − γ∗
]
+ θ(1−s)
s(1−τ)
[
γ∗s(1− τ)− γ
∗θ−η [1−s(1−τ)]
β
+ (1− δ)[1− s(1− τ)]
]}
> αMax
{
η
[
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
+ 1− δ − γ∗
]
+ θ(1−s)
s(1−τ)
[
s(1− τ)− γ
∗θ−η [1−s(1−τ)]
β
+ (1− δ)[1− s(1− τ)]
]}
Note first from (41) that
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
+ 1− δ − γ∗ > γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β(1−τ)
+ 1− δ − γ∗ > 0
Second note that when δ = 0, the inequality characterizing φ(αMax) becomes
φ(αMax) > αMax
{
η
[
γ∗θ−η−β
βs(1−τ)
+ 1− γ∗
]
+ θ(1−s)
s(1−τ)
[
1− γ
∗θ−η [1−s(1−τ)]
β
]}
with
1− γ
∗θ−η [1−s(1−τ)]
β
> 0 ⇔ γ∗ <
(
β
1−s(1−τ)
) 1
θ−η
Note then that(
β
1−s(1−τ)
) 1
θ−η
> γsup ⇔ 1− s(1− τ) < β
1
1−(θ−η)
which is satisfied when β = 1. Therefore, there exists δ1 ∈ (0, 1) and β1 ∈ (0, 1)
such that if δ ∈ (0, δ1), β ∈ (β1, 1) and θ − η ∈ (0, Θ¯), then φ(αMax) > 0
and thus B1(α)d
∗(α)α + θB2(α) > 0 for any α ∈ [0, αMax). Under these
conditions, and since d∗(α), B2(α) ≥ 0, it follows that D(α) is also positive for
any α ∈ [0, αMax).
We may now study the local stability properties of γ∗ ∈ (γ, γsup) with
α ∈ (0, αMax). Consider the characteristic polynomial. Straightforward com-
putations from Lemma 2 give
P (1) = − d
∗(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
[
(θ − η)
(
1− s− B2(α)
αγ∗
)
+B3
]
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Considering (36), we get
(θ − η)
(
1− s− B2(α)
αγ∗
)
+B3 = (θ − η)
[
1− s− sτ
αγ∗
−
(
1− sγ
∗θ−η−1
β
)
− 1−s
γ∗
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β
]
+ (1− s)γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η
(43)
which is clearly a monotone increasing function of α. So if there exists a
positive value of α for which this expression is equal to zero, that value must
be unique. Solving equation (43) equal to zero gives after simplifications
α =
(θ−η)sτ
(1−s)γ
(θ−η)
[
1− 1
1−s
(
1−s γ
∗θ−η−1
β
)
− 1
γ∗
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
β
]
+ γ
∗θ−η
−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η
=
τ(θ−η)s
1−s
γ∗θ−η−1[
1−(θ−η)γ
∗θ−η−1
β
]
[γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)]+γ∗θ−η
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
−1
)
(θ−η)s
1−s
= α¯
with α¯ as given by Lemma 7.1 (see (39)). Therefore, since d∗(α) > 0, we
conclude that P (1) T 0 if and only if α S α¯. We also get limλ→±∞ P (λ) = +∞.
Consider finally the expression of the trace T as given by (20) in Lemma 2.
Using the expressions given in (36), we compute
T ′(α) = d
∗
′
(α)
θγ∗(1−s)
[
γ∗θ−η [1−s−s(θ−η)]−β(1−δ)(1−s)
γ∗θ−η
]
− sτ
α2γ∗(1−s)
with
d∗
′
(α) =
(
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
βs(1−τ)
)
γ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
− 1
)
> 0
Since θ−η < 1, we get 1−s−s(θ−η) > 1−2s. Moreover, s ∈ (0, 1/2) implies
1− s− s(θ − η) > 0. As γ∗ < γsup, we derive
γ∗θ−η [1− s− s(θ − η)]− β(1− δ)(1− s)
< β
θ−η
θ−η−1
[
1− s− s(θ − η)− β
1
1−(θ−η) (1− δ)(1− s)
]
We then conclude that when β = 1 and δ = 0 the right-hand-side of this
equation is negative. Therefore there exist β2 ∈ (0, 1) and δ2 ∈ (0, 1) such
that if β ∈ (β2, 1) and δ ∈ (0, δ2), then T
′(α) < 0. It follows that the minimal
value of T (α) is obtained when α = αMax. From equation (34) in the proof of
Proposition 3 and using (42) we then derive:
T (αMax)− 2 =
(θ−η)d∗(αMax)
θγ∗
+ [B1(α)+B3]d
∗(αMax)
θγ∗(1−s)
+ B2(αMax)
αMaxγ∗(1−s)
− 1
= (θ−η)d
∗(αMax)
θγ∗
+ [B1(αMax)+B3]d
∗(αMax)
θγ∗(1−s)
+ γ
∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
γ∗β
We have shown in the proof of Lemma 7.2 that if θ− η ∈ (0, Θ¯), then B1(α)+
B3 > 0. Therefore, T (α) > 2 for any α ∈ [0, αMax). Let δ¯ = min{δ1, δ2}
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and β = max{β1, β2}. When δ ∈ (0, δ¯), β ∈ (β, 1) and θ − η ∈ (0, Θ¯), we
conclude finally that for any α ∈ [0, α¯), the normalized steady-state γ∗ is
locally determinate (a source) as both characteristic roots are larger than one,
and for any α ∈ (α¯, αMax), γ
∗ is locally indeterminate (a saddle-point) as one
root is less than one.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 5
We derive from equation (37) that when α = 0, the unique admissible steady-
state is γ∗. On the contrary, as soon as α > 0, we get limγ→+∞ h(γ, α) = −∞.
Since, when α ∈ (0, α¯) we have h′1(γ
∗, α) > 0, there necessarily exists a second
solution γ˜ > γ∗ of h(γ, α) = 0. When α = α¯ we get γ˜ = γ∗. When α > α¯,
straightforward computations yield
h(γinf , α) = −
[
τ − α
(
1− δ − [β(1− δ)]
1
θ−η
)]
and thus h(γinf , α) < 0 if and only if
α < τ
1−δ−[β(1−δ)]
1
θ−η
≡ αˆ ∈ (α¯, αMax) (44)
Therefore, when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ), the second solution exists and satisfies γ˜ ∈
(γinf , γ
∗). Note that (44) provides the same expression as the bound given
by (30).
We need now to check whether this second solution is admissible, i.e. if
d(γ˜) > 0. From Lemma 1, we know that, as long as γ˜ ∈ (γinf , γsup), d(γ˜) >
0. We then have to provide conditions on α to ensure that γ˜ ∈ (γinf , γsup).
Let us consider equation (37). We have shown that h′1(γ
∗, α) 6= 0 and thus
h′1(γ˜, α) 6= 0 as long as α 6= α¯. More precisely, we have
h′1(γ˜, α) T 0 ⇔ α T α¯ (45)
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we conclude that γ˜ = γ˜(α) with
γ˜′(α) = −h′2(γ˜, α)/h
′
1(γ˜, α) and γ˜(α¯) = γ
∗. Straightforward computations
using the fact that h(γ, α) = 0 along a steady-state yields
h′2(γ, α) =
τ
α
[
1−
(
γθ−η−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
) s
1−s
]
When α < α¯ we have h′1(γ
∗, α) > 0 and thus h′1(γ˜, α) < 0 with γ
∗ < γ˜. It
follows that h′2(γ˜, α) < 0 and thus γ˜
′(α) < 0. When α ∈ (α¯, αMax) we have
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h′1(γ
∗, α) < 0 and thus h′1(γ˜, α) > 0 with γ
∗ > γ˜. It follows that h′2(γ˜, α) > 0
and thus γ˜′(α) < 0. Therefore, for any α ∈ (0, α¯) ∪ (α¯, αMax), γ˜(α) is a
monotone decreasing function.
From this property, assuming β ∈ (β, 1), δ ∈ (0, δ¯) and θ − η ∈ (Θ, s),
we finally conclude that there exist α ∈ (0, α¯) and α1 ∈ (α¯, αˆ) such that the
second steady-state exists and is admissible, i.e. such that γ˜ ∈ (γinf , γsup), if
α ∈ (α, αˆ), and it satisfies:
- γ˜ ∈ (γ∗, γsup) if α ∈ (α, α¯),
- γ˜ ∈ (1, γ∗) if α ∈ (α¯, α1),
- γ˜ ∈ (γinf , 1) if α ∈ (α1, αˆ).
Using equation (37), the bounds α ∈ (0, α¯) and α1 ∈ (α¯, αˆ) are respectively
solutions of h(γsup, α) = 0 and h(1, α) = 0, and are equal to
α =
τ



β θ−ηθ−η−1−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)


s
1−s
−1


γ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
−1
)β θ−ηθ−η−1 −β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)


s
1−s
, α1 =
τ
[(
1−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
) s
1−s
−1
]
γ∗
(
γ∗θ−η−1
β
−1
)(
1−β(1−δ)
γ∗θ−η−β(1−δ)
) s
1−s
−
1−β
β
Note finally that h′1(γ
∗, α) and h′1(γ˜, α) have opposite sign and that this sign
changes as α crosses α¯.
References
[1] Barro, R. (1990): “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endoge-
nous Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 98, 103-125.
[2] Baum, A., C. Checherita-Westphal and P. Rother (2013): “Debt and
Growth: New Evidence for the Euro Area,” Journal of International
Money and Finance 32, 809–821
[3] Cazzavillan, G. (1996): “Public Spending, Endogenous Growth, and En-
dogenous Fluctuations,” Journal of Economic Theory 71, 394-415.
[4] Collard, F., M. Habib and J.-C. Rochet (2013): “How Can Governments
Borrow so Much?,” mimeo Toulouse School of Economics.
38
[5] Collard, F., M. Habib and J.-C. Rochet (2015): “Sovereign Debt Sus-
tainability in Advanced Economies,” Journal of the European Economic
Association 13, 381-420.
[6] de la Croix, D. and P. Michel (2002): A Theory of Economic Growth,
Dynamics and Policy in Overlapping Generations. Cambridge University
Press.
[7] Eberhart, M. and A. Presbitero (2015): “Public Debt and Growth: Het-
erogeneity and Non-Linearity,” Journal of International Economics 97,
45-58.
[8] Futagami, K., T. Iwaisako and R. Ohdoi (2008): “Debt Policy Rule, Pro-
ductive Government Spending, and Multiple Growth Paths,” Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics 12, 445-462.
[9] Greiner, A. and W. Semmler (1999): “An Endogenous Growth Model
with Public Capital and Government Borrowing,” Annals of Operations
Research 88, 65–79.
[10] Greiner, A. and W. Semmler (2000): “Endogenous Growth, Government
Debt and Budgetary Regimes,” Journal of Macroeconomics 22, 363–384.
[11] Gruber, J. (2013): “A Tax-Based Estimate of the Elasticity of Intertem-
poral Substitution,” Quarterly Journal of Finance 3, 1-20.
[12] Herndon, T., M. Ash and R. Pollin (2014): “Does High Public Debt Con-
sistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff,”
Cambridge Journal of Economics 38, 257-279.
[13] Minea, A. and A. Parent (2012): “Is High Public Debt Always Harmful
to Economic Growth? Reinhart and Rogoff and Some Complex Nonlin-
earities,” Working Paper 8, Association franc¸aise de Cliome´trie.
[14] Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2012): “Persistent Deficit, Growth, and Inde-
terminacy,” Macroeconomic Dynamics 16, 267-283.
[15] Minea, A. and P. Villieu (2013): “Debt Policy Rule, Productive Govern-
ment Spending, and Multiple Growth Paths: a Note,” Macroeconomic
Dynamics 17, 947-954.
39
[16] Mulligan, C. (2002): “Capital Interest and Aggregate Intertemporal Sub-
stitution,” NBER Working Paper 9373.
[17] Ni, S. (1995): “An Empirical Analysis on the Substitutability Between
Private Consumption and Government Purchases,” Journal of Monetary
Economics 36, 593–605.
[18] Nishimura, K., C. Nourry, T. Seegmuller and A. Venditti (2015): “On the
(De)stabilizing Effect of Public Debt in a Ramsey Model with Heteroge-
neous Agents,” International Journal of Economic Theory 11, 7-24.
[19] Nishimura, K., T. Seegmuller and A. Venditti (2015): “Fiscal Policy, Debt
Constraint and Expectations-Driven Volatility,” Journal of Mathematical
Economics 61, 305-316.
[20] Panizza, U. and A. Presbitero (2013): “Public Debt and Economic
Growth in Advanced Economies: A Survey,” Swiss Journal of Economics
and Statistics 149, 175-204.
[21] Reinhart, C., V. Reinhart and K. Rogoff (2012): “Public Debt Over-
hangs: Advanced-Economy Episodes since 1800,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 26, 69-86.
[22] Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2010): “Growth in a Time of Debt,” Ameri-
can Economic Review 100, 573-578.
[23] Reinhart, C., K. Rogoff, and M. Savastano (2003): “Debt Intolerance,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Spring, 1-62.
[24] Saint-Paul, G. (1992): “Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 1243-1259.
[25] Sutherland, D., P. Hoeller, R. Merola, and V. Zieman (2012): “Debt and
Macroeconomic Stability,” OECD Economic Department Working Paper
10003.
[26] Vissing-Jorgensen, A. and O. Attanasio (2003): “Stock-Market Participa-
tion, Intertemporal Substitution and Risk Aversion,” American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 93, 383-391.
40
[27] Woo, J. and S. Kumar (2015): “Public Debt and Growth,” Economica
82, 705-739.
41
